In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with 'divided loyalties', and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates 'winners' and 'losers'. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the 'loyalties' of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation.
Introduction
Free-riding can be ubiquitous in social dilemma settings, leading to significant inefficiencies in the provision of group public goods (see, for instance, Chaudhuri, 2011) . Proposed solutions to raise cooperation levels within groups and teams include, among others, costly sanctioning (for instance, Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000) and rewards (Sefton et al., 2007) .
These solutions however involve the external introduction of additional institutions or enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, such institutions are not always efficiency-enhancing (see Gächter et al., 2008) .
Another stream of literature focuses on the incentive effects of inter-group competition through contests or tournaments between groups that each face a social dilemma. Competition has been found to alleviate, to some extent, the free-rider problem while also increasing efficiency (for instance, Bornstein et al., 1990; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2015) . Such competition, however, requires the introduction of an additional prize (such as monopoly rents) that changes the incentive structure, thus inducing teams to compete. Further, it often requires the intervention of an external 'contest designer'.
By contrast, we examine the effect on group cooperation of competition between teams for the resources provided by individuals who have joint team membership. This form of competition is inherent in many production settings and does not require the imposition of additional external mechanisms, changes in the payoff/incentive structures or the intervention of designers.
We begin with the observation that resources that enhance team production are limited and scarce, and teams often compete to attract members who can provide additional resources. Such situations arise naturally when individuals can simultaneously belong to multiple teams. For instance, at the micro level, researchers simultaneously work on multiple projects with different sets of co-authors. Musicians may play in several bands simultaneously. At the macro level, countries often belong to multiple international organisations. Our study is based on the premise that in these situations, group members want to belong to teams that maximise their earnings potential, while teams want individuals to devote (more) resources to them rather than to other teams. Competition, and the possibility of free-riding, is thus inherent in the production process.
One way current members can attract other members to their team is to increase their own input (and hence their output), signalling higher earnings potential in their team. That is, interaction between teams in a naturally occurring 'market for talent' may itself provide a boost to team effort. We ask the following questions: (1) Do team members increase effort when competing for the resources of team members with 'divided loyalties'? (2) How do team members with divided loyalties respond to the efforts of team members across the teams in which they are a member? (3) Does competition for the resources of team members help mitigate the free-rider problem inherent in team production? (4) How are the answers to the above questions related to the level of information team members have about other teams' actions, as well as by the ability to ostracise team members?
We use laboratory experiments to examine behaviour in pairs of teams producing independent team-level public goods. Our design captures the divided loyalties settings described above in a context where all members have the same resource endowments, but a subset of members may belong to multiple groups simultaneously. To isolate the effects of competition, only one individual (referred to as the common-member) is a member of both groups and receives benefits from the public good produced in each group. The other individuals (referred to as dedicated-members) are members of only one of the two paired groups.
The literature has paid little attention to this source of competition and its potential as a solution to social dilemmas. Two recent studies, however, investigate cooperation in settings related to ours. Falk et al. (2013) investigate multiple group membership in team production, where all individuals belong to two teams simultaneously, but no two individuals belong in more than one team together (there is no overlap in team membership). Each individual receives separate resource endowments for each team, implying multiple team membership has no implications for resources within teams. Similarly, in McCarter et al. (2014) , every member belongs to two teams simultaneously. In their "different" treatment, there is no overlap in team membership, as in Falk et al. (2013) . In their "same" treatment, there is perfect overlap in team membership. However, in their treatments, each individual receives only one resource endowment that must be shared between the two teams. Note that in the "different" and "same" treatments, all individuals have divided loyalties. Both studies find that individuals increase contributions to more cooperative groups, but only when there is no overlap between team members. 1 Our setting is more limited for those with single group membership. Unlike in the above mentioned studies, in our decision settings, dedicated-members do not have the option to 'take their talents' elsewhere. Their only option to increase earnings is to attract the member with divided loyalties to contribute to their team. We appeal to Sugden (1984) 's theory of reciprocity to generate testable hypotheses for behaviour in the particular VCM setting with divided loyalties that we study.
We find that, in fixed groups, competition for the resources of the common-member is a mixed blessing, creating winners and losers. Particularly, the overall performance of groups in a competing pair crucially depends on initial cooperation levels. Groups that start out with higher cooperation levels successfully attract the loyalty of the common-member, and stem the decline in contributions that is usually observed in groups. Common-members reduce contributions to the initially low-performing group. The common-member's switching behaviour has a strong, and lasting, negative impact on this group; contributions of dedicated-members decline over time. 2 Thus, competition alone might be insufficient to improve cooperation and performance in all teams, particularly in the initially low-performing team.
We next investigate the role of information in augmenting cooperation. When dedicatedmembers are additionally informed about the common-member's contributions in the other group, they can make better decisions on whether he/she is worth competing for. In the presence of such information, we find that common-members increase their contributions and treat both groups equally. The initially low-performing groups recover to a certain extent, with dedicated-members also increasing contributions. However, they still perform worse than the initially better-performing groups, though now only marginally so. Thus, we find that while additional information has some success, there is still room for improvement.
Finally, inherent in many team production settings is the ability of individuals and organisations to endogenously decide on their membership. Previous work established the power of the threat of expulsion (Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005) , the ability to leave one's current team and move to a different team (Gürerk et al., 2006; Ahn et al., 2008 Ahn et al., , 2009 , or a combination of these (Charness and Yang, 2014) to improve team outcomes. 3 Building on the initial decision setting with fixed teams, we also investigate the extent to which endogenous group composition, in the form of ostracism from teams, alleviates inefficiencies in team production when teams compete for resources. We find that ostracism of team members by majority vote enables both teams in a competing pair to stem the decline in cooperation. Initial performance does not dictate overall performance of competing groups and both groups successfully use the threat of expulsion to attract the loyalty of the common-member and the dedicated-members. Ostracism allows groups to exclude the least cooperative individuals, thus 'punishing' free-riding.
Section 2 presents our game setting with divided loyalties. Section 3 presents the model of reciprocity and behavioural hypotheses for our game setting. Section 4 presents the design of, and results from, our first set of experiments investigating the pure effect of divided loyalties in fixed groups. Section 5 presents experimental results from our second and third sets of experiments investigating the role of information and ostracism on behaviour in the setting. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A in the Electronic Supplementary Material contains our experimental instructions and Appendix B presents additional analyses.
Team production with divided loyalties
The decision setting studied is a stylised simplification of examples from the field where one individual is a member of two teams, while other individuals belong to only one of the two teams. Groups of n subjects participate in a repeated linear public goods game (VCM). Thus, team production is in the form of a local public good that benefits team members. Each individual receives an endowment e > 0 that he/she can allocate between a group account (0 ≤ ≤ e) and a private account (e -). The return from the private account is one while the return from the group account (the public good) is a fraction m (0 < m < 1< mn) of the total allocation to the group account by all members of the group, = ∑ .
Subjects play identical VCM games in pairs of two groups of n members each -Group X and Group Y. Each group consists of (n -1) dedicated-members who belong only to that group.
Additionally, there is one common-member who belongs to both groups. Figure 1 describes the interaction structure in the game.
Figure 1. Structure of interaction with divided loyalties
Each of the 2(n -1) + 1 members receives an endowment of e > 0. Note that the commonmember does not receive an additional endowment for belonging to multiple groups. Within the stage game, contributions to the public good by members of Groups X and Y impact only their group. That is, there are no production spillovers across groups. Each of the (n -1) dedicated-members can contribute to, and receive returns from, the public good in his/her group alone. The common-member can contribute to, and receives returns from, the public goods in Groups X and Y.
The payoff of a member i who only belongs to Group X is given by ( − ) + ∑ ∈ and the payoff of a member i who only belongs to Group Y is given by
where j includes the common-member. The payoff of the common-member, c, is given by
Based on group members having own-regarding preferences and an assumption that all members assume each other group member has own-regarding preferences, the unique Nash equilibrium contribution level in the stage game is to contribute 0 tokens to a team's local public good. The unique social optimum (maximising group income) contribution level is for each group member to contribute e to the team's local public good. For the common-member, any allocation between the two group-level public goods is socially optimal as long as he/she contributes e.
Previous findings, however, show that neither the Nash equilibrium nor the social optimum strictly predicts group behaviour in public goods experiments. Average contributions typically lie between the two extremes (Chaudhuri, 2011) . This robust finding is the basis of our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Contributions are positive in both Groups X and Y.
Based on a model of reciprocity, we next develop behavioural hypotheses specific to our setting. Sugden (1984) first formalised a model of reciprocal behaviour in simultaneous voluntary contribution games. This modelling approach has been particularly useful in explaining positive contributions in a wide range of public goods settings. In particular, in linear VCM game settings, Croson (2007) compares the behavioural predictions of three models of behaviouraltruism, commitment and reciprocity, and finds support only for Sugden's model of reciprocity. Sugden (1984) introduces the 'principle of reciprocity' which states that, in each possible hypothetical subgroup that a person can be in (with at least one other person), he/she is 'obliged to' contribute at least the minimum of: (i) at least as much as he/she would like everyone in the subgroup to contribute, as long as the others are contributing the same, or (ii) the minimum contribution by the others in the subgroup. The principle itself is neither a description of behaviour nor an appeal to social preferences, but a constraint on behaviour. Thus, individuals choose contribution levels by "maximising their self-interest subject to the principle of reciprocity" (Croson, 2007, p. 204) . Note that even though there are several constraints to be met, a player still chooses only one contribution level for the group as a whole. Sugden (1984) examines reciprocity when there is a single group, i.e., when there are no group members with divided loyalties. We first present the decision problem for dedicated-members in Group X who are reciprocal and then extend the model to reciprocal common-members. A dedicated-member's problem can be stated as 4
Reciprocity in a setting with divided loyalties
where is the member's preferred (optimal) contribution level for all members (including him/herself) in each sub-group l ⊆ to which the member can belong. A member's preferred optimal contribution in a sub-group is defined as his/her utility maximising contribution level,
assuming the contributions of all other members of the sub-group are the same (Sugden 1984, p. 777 ). In the linear VCM setting, assuming a monotonic relationship between wealth and utility, Croson (2007) shows that a group member's preferred contribution is the entire endowment (the group payoff maximising contribution) as long as public good provision is socially optimal for the subgroup (Croson 2007, p. 202, footnote 6) . In our setting, an MPCR of 0.6 ensures that contributing to the public good is socially optimal in the smallest possible sub-group of two members. Note that since the optimisation problem that determines is carried out independently for each sub-group, reciprocal members will also prefer contributions equal to 100% of endowment in each sub-group. Hence = ∀ ⊆ and ∀ ∈ . In the context of a single-group setting, it is feasible to prefer contributions that are 100% of endowment, and to also achieve this goal. 4 The problem for a dedicated-member in Group Y is symmetric.
The common-member's decision (assuming he/she follows the principle of reciprocity), can be described by
where l and p are subgroups of X and Y to which the common-member belongs, and and are the common-member's utility-maximising preferred (optimal) contribution levels for all members (including him/herself) in sub-groups l and p of Groups X and Y respectively. The third constraint is the resource constraint faced by the common-member. Once again, the fact that the optimisation problems which determine the common-member's preferred contributions in each sub-group are carried out independently for each feasible sub-group implies that = ∀ ⊆ and = ∀ ⊆ .
Note, like dedicated-members, it is feasible for common-members to attain their preferred contributions in one Group (X or Y), under the same full contribution scenario. However, it is not possible for common-members to attain their preferred full contribution in both groups of which they are a member. Full contributions by all members in one of the groups implies that the common-member's contribution in the other group will be zero. That is, while preferred contributions are 100% in each sub-group, the common-member's actual contributions across Groups X and Y are limited by the resource constraint.
Although the formal theory developed above, in accordance with Sugden (1984) , is based on reciprocal members contributing the minimum within each subgroup, we appeal to the empirical literature on linear VCM games for guidance in developing the behavioural hypotheses for our experiments. In particular, Croson (2007) finds strong support of reciprocal behaviour in a single group VCM experiment, where the primary reference point is the median/mean of other group members' contributions. 5 The hypotheses below are based on extending this result to each Group X and Y in our game setting.
Contributions of the common-member
Hypothesis 1 implies that at least one member of each Group (X and Y) makes positive contribution to the public good. The first two constraints for a reciprocal common-member state that he/she must meet his/her obligations to both groups. Thus, the common-member cannot completely ignore either group. 6
Hypothesis 2: Contributions of common-members are positive in Groups X and Y.
Suppose all members in a group are meeting their obligation to contribute the average of the others in the group. Now, suppose member j increases his/her contribution. Member i (i ≠ j) is obliged to increase his/her own contribution in response. Thus, an implication of the theory of reciprocity is conditional cooperation; reciprocal members' contributions are positively correlated with the contributions of others in their group, i.e., ⁄ > 0 for some ≠ ∈ (and similarly for Group Y). Croson (2007) tests, and finds support for, this comparative statics prediction. More broadly, this is a robust finding in the VCM literature. Group members are often conditional co-operators, where contributions are increasing in the contributions of the other group members (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001 and Kocher et al., 2008) .
In our setting, conditional cooperation implies a shifting of the common-member's loyalty (i.e., resources) from one group to the other. This is because a higher average contribution by one group, ceteris paribus, raises the common-member's obligation in that group. That is, he/she must contribute more in the group with higher contributions by dedicated-members (henceforth, HighC groups). Conversely, the common-member's obligation in the other group (the group with lower contributions by dedicated-membershenceforth, LowC groups) is lower, thus leading to lower contributions in that group. Note that subjects receive feedback on 5 Croson (2007, page 213) , "…we test whether the minimum, maximum or median contribution of the other three players is a better predictor of a subject's own contribution. We find significant evidence for median reciprocity, suggesting that subjects try to match the median or average contributions of others, rather than the minimum (as suggested by Sugden's theory of reciprocity) …". Note that in our setting with 3 members in a group, the mean and median are equivalent in relation to the other group members. 6 Based on the endowment constraint, the hypotheses that follow presume contributions will be below 100% of the endowment.
others' contributions only after the first decision round. Thus, this argument only applies from the second round onwards. This gives our next prediction.
Hypothesis 3: Following the first decision round, the common-member will contribute more to the group with higher average contributions by dedicated-members.
Contributions of dedicated-members
Hypothesis 3 implies that, following the first decision round, the common-member favours one of the two groups. That is, by increasing (decreasing) his/her contributions in one group (the other group), he/she is increasing (decreasing) obligations for reciprocal dedicated-members in that (the other) group. The implication is that contributions would increase (decrease) in the group that he/she favours (does not favour). This gives our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (Dedicated-member's conditional cooperation):
Contributions of dedicatedmembers in Groups X and Y will tend to diverge.
Importantly, if group members expect others to be reciprocal, they can then use their choices to influence the choices of others in their group. In particular, they can increase the contribution obligations of other group members by increasing their own contributions. It is under this circumstance that reciprocity predicts that competition for 'talent' can increase effort.
Dedicated-members can increase their effort in an attempt to oblige the reciprocal commonmember to increase effort in their group. The logic of dedicated-members competing for the resources of the common-member provides Hypothesis 5 as an alternative to Hypothesis 4. 7
Hypothesis 5 (Competition for the common-member): Contributions of dedicated-members
in Groups X and Y will tend to converge.
In addition to the group dynamics implied by Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, we can also draw inferences regarding contributions of common and dedicated-members within groups. As noted above, common members have the same resource endowment as dedicated-members and thus face a resource constraint in deciding how to allocate their contributions between the two groups. If common-members choose to match the average contribution of others in the HighC 7 Motivations for individual behaviour as captured by reciprocity are independent of the number of group members or groups. Our hypotheses can be extended to cases with multiple common-members and to cases where the common-member is a member of more than two groups. A discussion of these extensions is reported in Appendix C.
group, it may not be feasible for them to match the average contribution of others in the LowC group. In paired groups in which this is the case, we could expect to see dedicated-members reduce their contribution towards the common-member's constrained contribution in both groups. Thus, we would expect to observe behaviour more consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4. On the other hand, it is plausible that dedicated-members may see value in competing for the loyalties for the common-member, while also recognising the limited resources the common-member has for contributions. In particular, this perspective by dedicated-members may induce them to respond more strongly to the competition for the common-member's loyalty by contributing more than the common-member. Such behaviour would be interpreted as being consistent with Hypothesis 5.
Contributions in the presence of divided loyalties

Experimental design and procedures
Treatment CM implements the above game setting with divided loyalties. Group X and Group Y consist of two dedicated-members each, while one common-member is a member of both groups, i.e., n = 3. Each of the five subjects receives a per-round endowment of 20 tokens.
Subjects simultaneously choose how many tokens to contribute to their respective group accounts and how many to retain in their private accounts. As is the standard, although the experimental instructions used neutral language, we refer to allocations to the group account as contributions to the group public good.
As discussed above, each token retained in the private account yields a return of 1 token to the individual. Each token contributed to the public good within a group yields a return of 0.6 tokens to each group member, i.e., MPCR = m = 0.6. Subjects interact repeatedly for T = 20 decision rounds, and this is public information provided before the first decision round.
The treatment No-CM is designed to contrast behaviour in CM. In No-CM, groups of n = 3 members make decisions in independent VCM games, where all three members belong to only one group, and no information is shared across groups.
After all subjects make contributions decisions, each member is informed of the total allocation to the group account and individual contributions of all members in the group. Commonmembers receive this information for both groups while dedicated-members receive information only for their group. Importantly, dedicated-members are not informed of the common-member's contribution (or those of dedicated-members) in the other group.
Subjects' individual contributions are identified by ID letters that are assigned randomly at the beginning of the experiment and then remain fixed throughout the session. In CM, subjects are assigned IDs A through E. Group X is composed of members A, B and C while Group Y is composed of members C, D and E. Thus, member C is the common-member. In No-CM, each independent group is composed of members A, B and C. In addition, subjects are shown a history table with the total allocation to the group account in all previous rounds. The commonmember receives this information for Groups X and Y.
All sessions were conducted at the University of South Dakota using student subjects. No subject participated in more than one session of the experiment, i.e., a between-subject design. 8
At the beginning of each session in CM, subjects were randomly divided into groups of five, with the role of common or dedicated-members and assignment to Groups X or Y also being determined randomly. In No-CM, subjects were randomly divided into groups of three. Groups and roles within groups remained fixed throughout a session.
Subjects received printed instructions that they read at their own pace. To ensure that important elements of the game were common information to all subjects, an experimenter also read aloud a pre-prepared summary of the instructions. Before the experiment could begin, all subjects
had to correctly answer a quiz that tested their understanding of the game and calculation of payoffs. At the end of the 20 rounds in a session, subjects answered a short demographic questionnaire.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . A total of 60 subjects (12 independent paired-groups of five subjects) participated in CM, and 30 subjects (10 independent groups of three subjects) participated in No-CM. Subjects were paid their token earnings from all 20 rounds. Token earnings were converted to cash at the rate of 30 tokens to US$1. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes and subjects earned an average of $19.48 (min = $11.85, max = $38.31, st. dev. = 3.89). Subjects were not paid a separate show-up fee.
Results
The discussion of results is based on the order of the hypotheses presented above, with They are available upon request.
LowC (HighC) groups in a pair are defined as those with lower (higher) combined contributions by dedicated-members in the first round. 9 Averaging across all 20 decision rounds, LowC groups had lower group contributions than HighC groups in 11 out of 12 paired comparisons of five-member groups. 10 9 There were two pairs in CM where group contributions were tied in the first round. For these pairs, the tiebreaking rule for determining LowC (HighC) was lower (higher) group contributions by dedicated-members in the second round. There were no ties in the second round. Further, for these two pairs, the group with higher contributions in the second round also had higher contributions across all additional rounds. In addition, there are no systematic effects of the group labels (X and Y). than zero for all roles (SR p < 0.01 in all cases). Thus, as in previous studies using the single group VCM setting, we find support for Hypothesis 1.
Result 1: Average contributions are significantly greater than zero in both groups in CM and in single groups in No-CM.
The left panel of Figure 2 and Table 1 show that common-members do not completely abandon either group. Thus we find support for Hypothesis 2.
Result 2: Average contributions of common-members are significantly greater than zero in both HighC and LowC groups.
Based on reciprocity, contributions of the common-member in each group depend on his/her obligations in each group. Figure 2 shows that common-members start out in round 1 by contributing, on average, an equal amount of approximately 4 tokens to the public good in both groups. In the remaining rounds, on average, common-members contribute a lower amount (approximately 4 tokens) to the LowC groups and increase contributions to approximately 7-8 tokens in the HighC groups. Table 1 confirms these patterns. There is no significant difference in the contributions of the common-member between LowC and HighC groups in the first round (SR p = 0.496). However, average contributions of the common-members are significantly higher in HighC groups than in LowC groups in the second round (SR p = 0.027), and in all 20 rounds overall (SR p = 0.054). 12 Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 3.
Result 3:
In CM, in the first round, common-members on average contribute similar amounts to the public good in Groups X and Y. In the remaining rounds, the average of commonmembers' contributions are significantly higher (lower) in the HighC (LowC) groups. Table 1 confirm these observations. SR tests show that there is a significant difference in average contributions of dedicated-members in LowC and HighC groups in the first round (p = 0.003), in the second round (p = 0.005), and in all 20 rounds overall (p = 0.008).
Average contributions of dedicated-members in HighC and LowC groups diverge over time.
Thus, we find evidence in support of Hypothesis 4, and against Hypothesis 5. 13
Result 4: After the first round, average contributions of dedicated-members in HighC groups are stable at higher levels throughout the game. Average contributions of dedicated-members in LowC groups decline steadily over time.
The combination of higher (lower) contributions by both common-members and dedicatedmembers implies that group contributions are higher (lower) in HighC (LowC) groups throughout the experimental session. A SR test confirms that average group contributions are significantly higher in HighC than in LowC groups (32.13 tokens vs. 17.00 tokens; SR p = 0.010). Further, neither is higher than group contributions in No-CM. 14 The above Results suggest that, in CM, there is path dependence in the contributions of common and dedicated-members. On average, members of groups that start out with higher Further, Figure 2 and Table 1 show that on average the contributions of dedicated-members in HighC groups are similar to contributions of members in No-CM. However, contributions of dedicated-members in LowC groups are significantly lower than contributions in No-CM (p = 0.0068). These two results provide further evidence of the effects of conditional cooperation.
As discussed above, in all treatments, each subject was endowed with 20 tokens in each decision round. Thus, common-members must divide their endowment between groups in order to make contributions in both groups. Even prior to round 1 decisions, it appears that dedicated-members may have anticipated this limitation on a common-member's contributions and lowered their contributions relative to group members in No-CM. This effect is magnified across decision rounds as contributions in LowC groups decline at a faster rate than HighC groups. Thus, in the presence of divided loyalties in CM, individual contributions do not increase relative to levels observed in the groups in No-CM. It is in this sense that we do not find support for Hypothesis 5 that competition for the common-member in the CM treatment leads to more cooperation.
The evidence presented above for conditional cooperation (Result 4) suggests that the contributions of dedicated-members would converge to the (lower) contribution of the common-member in both HighC and LowC groups. However, such a convergence is not fully observed. Figure 2 and Table 1 show that average contributions of dedicated-members are higher than those of common-members in both LowC and HighC groups. This difference in average contributions is statistically significant for HighC (SR p = 0.003) and LowC (SR p = 0.002) groups. 15
Result 5: Average contributions of dedicated-members in CM are significantly higher than the average contributions of common-members in both LowC and HighC groups.
In CM, common-members receive group returns from both groups while dedicated-members receive group returns only from their own group. In this sense, common-members enjoy a 'privileged position' relative to dedicated-members. Result 5 suggests that common-members, as in van Leeuwen et al. (2018), benefit from their position. 16 Note that their total contribution in both groups is 11.6 tokens on average. 17 Thus, on average, their endowment is not a binding constraint for contributions, suggesting they have opportunities to increase contributions in both groups.
This raises the question of why dedicated-members don't respond more strongly to the lower contributions received from common-members by lowering their own contributions. As noted above, the reaction of dedicated-members to the contributions of the common-member in their group might be tempered by knowing that common members share their contributions across both groups. Result 5 could plausibly be interpreted as an attempt by dedicated-members in a group to attempt to attract the loyalty of the common-member to their group. In this sense, there is partial evidence for competition between groups (Hypothesis 5) for the resources of 15 To check the consistency with which common-members contributed less than dedicated-members in their groups, we compared average contributions across all rounds (excluding the first round). Common-members in CM contributed less than dedicated-members in 83% of all decisions in HighC Groups and in 100% of all decisions in LowC Groups. 16 Result 5 is similar to the finding in van Leeuwen et al. (2018) who study public goods games where group members have heterogeneous 'power'. In their Centrality treatment, one group member (the central player) connects two otherwise separate sub-groups, enabling the group as a whole to create a larger public good and thus generate greater surplus. They find the central player contributes less than other members of the group, and thus also benefits from his position. 17 The average total contribution to both groups by common-members is not significantly different from the average contribution of 12.17 tokens by dedicated-members in HighC groups (RS p > 0.10).
the common-member. However, that competition is not found to be sufficient to override the decay in total group contributions in the LowC groups.
Accentuating reciprocity: information and ostracism
Competition for the resources of the common-member has the potential to sustain cooperation in teams. However, based on the results presented above, this potential is realised in only one group in the pair, i.e., it creates clear 'winners' and 'losers'. Moreover, initial performance determines which group benefits from the competition. Thus, the above results suggest that, even in the presence of competition between groups, there is room for improvement. As seen in CM, the common-members' contributions are significantly lower than the dedicatedmembers' contributions in both HighC and LowC groups. Thus, despite having a single endowment to divide between Groups X and Y, on average the common-member has the resources to increase contributions to each group in order to decrease the difference between his/her contributions and the contributions of the dedicated-members in the HighC and LowC groups.
The hypothesis that competition increases cooperation in both groups relies on dedicatedmembers knowing that the common-member is reciprocal. It is only under this circumstance that dedicated-members can raise their contributions anticipating that this will lead to increased contributions by the common-member. We next consider one mechanism that allows dedicated-members insight into the common-member's reciprocity. CM-Info gives dedicatedmembers information on the common-member's contribution in both groups. We also consider a second mechanism, CM-Ostracism, allowing group members the opportunity to 'enforce' reciprocity in their groupsmembers can exclude other members from their group by majority voting. Both mechanisms lead to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: Relative to CM, both CM-Info and CM-Ostracism will lead to stronger convergence in contribution decisions of common-members and dedicated-members within
and across groups.
Note that hypotheses 1-5 provided above remain applicable and will also be tested in the game settings below.
Additional information on the common-member
In CM dedicated-members could only observe the contributions of the common-member and the other dedicated-member in their own group. They could not observe the common-member's total contribution in both groups. If dedicated-members knew the common-member's total contribution, they would have more complete information on his/her contribution 'type'. More specifically, if the common member's contributions were known to be sufficiently high in the
HighC group, dedicated-members in the LowC group might reasonably conclude that he/she was sufficiently reciprocal, and therefore be encouraged to contribute higher amounts in order to compete for the resources of the common-member.
Thus, this information about the common-member's total contribution is potentially crucial to allow dedicated-members to draw inferences on whether the common-member is worth competing for. Further, information transparency concerning the common-member's contributions weaken the common-member's privileged position. Relative to the dedicatedmembers, the common-member no longer has an information advantage on contributions. This could also lead to higher contributions by the common member.
CM-Info was created to remove the asymmetric information surrounding the common member's contributions. In this treatment, a common-member's contributions to both groups are observed by all dedicated-members in Groups X and Y. This was the only change relative to CM. As in CM, dedicated-members in CM-Info did not receive information on the contributions of dedicated-members in the other group. In CM-Info, data was collected on 10 (X, Y) pairs (a total of 50 subjects).
As in the analysis of CM, LowC (HighC) groups in a pair are defined as those with lower (higher) combined contributions by dedicated-members in the first round. 18 Averaging across all 20 decision rounds, LowC groups in CM-Info had lower group contributions than HighC groups in 9 out of 10 paired comparisons of five-member groups. 19
Figure 3 (a) displays average individual contributions over time by common-members in
HighC groups (left panel) and in LowC groups (right panel). For purposes of comparison, the figure also presents the corresponding information from CM. Figure 3 (b) presents the trends for average contributions by dedicated-members. As in CM, the common-member in CM-Info contributes positive amounts to both groups. Thus we find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Further, as in CM, average contributions of the common-member are higher in HighC groups than in LowC. However, unlike in CM, this difference is not significant in CM-Info (SR p = 0.1688). Thus, on average, relative to CM, the common-member in CM-Info discriminates less between groups in the presence of information about his/her overall contributions. Thus, in the presence of this additional information, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3.
Result 6: Unlike in CM, in CM-Info the average of common-members' contributions are not significantly different between HighC and LowC groups.
Relative to CM, the average of common-members' contributions are somewhat higher in
HighC groups in CM-Info (10 vs. 7.79 tokens); but the difference is not statistically significant.
However, the average of common-members' contributions are significantly higher in LowC groups in CM-Info than in CM (7.09 vs. 3.81 tokens; RS p = 0.0479). Further, the average of common-members' total contributions to both groups are significantly higher in CM-Info than in CM (17.09 vs. 11.6 tokens; RS p = 0.0192).
Result 7: Relative to CM, average contributions by common-members in CM-Info are significantly greater to LowC groups and in total.
In support of Hypothesis 4, in CM-Info average contributions by dedicated-members in HighC groups are significantly higher than in LowC groups (SR p = 0.024). Relative to CM, contributions of dedicated-members in HighC groups are no different in CM-Info. Further, while the decline in contributions is less pronounced and average contributions are higher in
LowC groups in CM-Info than in CM, the difference is not significant (RS p = 0.3912). Thus, the additional information in CM-Info is unsuccessful in leading to a significant increase in the contributions of dedicated-members. It does, however, lead to a significant increase in contributions of common-members. Further, at the group level, unlike in CM, the difference in group contributions between HighC and LowC groups is only marginally significant (36.11 vs.
24.42 tokens; SR p = 0.0593). 20 In summary, the additional information provided in CM-Info appears to induce common-members to increase their total contributions and to be less discriminating between HighC and LowC groups. In turn, dedicated-members are found to marginally increase their contributions, consistent with their competing for the resources of the common-member. This change in contributions by dedicated-members is, however, not sufficiently strong to provide support for Hypotheses 5.
Based on Results 6-8, however, we do find partial support for Hypothesis 6. While commonmembers' contributions are lower than those of dedicated-members, the difference is only marginally significant in both HighC and LowC groups (SR p = 0.0745 and 0.0926 respectively). Further, relative to CM, the endowment constraint on common-members is more of a factor in the ability of common-members to significantly increase their contributions. Out of the endowment of 20 tokens, the common-member is now contributing an average of 17.09 tokens. 21 Thus, we observe convergence across groups in the common-member's efforts.
Moreover, we observe near-convergence within LowC and HighC Groups between the contributions of common and dedicated-members. Neither of these is observed in CM.
Ostracism by majority voting
Inherent in many team production settings is the opportunity for individuals and organisations to endogenously decide their membership. Previous work established the power of the threat of expulsion to improve team outcomes (Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005) . 22 Group 20 See Appendix B2.2 for an analysis of group contributions in CM-Info. 21 Common-members in CM-Info contribute their entire endowment of 20 tokens in 124 out of 200 decisions (62%). One common-member contributed all 20 tokens in all 20 rounds, and 6 out of 10 common-members contributed at least 18 tokens on average over the 20 rounds. 22 Güth et al. (2007) show that exclusion by a central authority (leader) is also effective in raising contributions to team production. In all these works, individuals can only be a member of one group at a time. Hence, they face no divided loyalties as is the case in this study. members can be ostracised for not contributing 'sufficiently' to the public good, i.e., for not reciprocating others' contributions. Thus, ostracism can be a powerful tool to ensure that group members act reciprocally. By helping to reduce the uncertainty related to the reciprocity of other members, ostracism has the potential to raise contributions by all members in a group.
CM-Ostracism retains the information structure from CM, i.e., dedicated-members only see the contribution of the common-member and dedicated-members in their own groups. However, an additional stage is added to each round. In this second stage of each round, group members anonymously vote, at zero cost, whether or not they want to exclude other members of the group. Any group member who receives at least 50% of possible exclusion votes is then excluded from the group in the next round. The common-member votes in both groups and can also be excluded from both groups. An ostracised member cannot make a contribution decision or vote in the next round, and also does not receive earnings from the group account in that round. This member simply retains his/her endowment. The group members who are not ostracised make a contribution decision, and participate in the ostracism vote, in the next round.
If a common-member is excluded from one group, he/she can still contribute and vote in the group from which he/she is not excluded. 23
Note that with ostracism, more than one member can be excluded in any round. If two or more members are excluded in a round, there is no contribution decision in that group. In those circumstances, all group members receive their endowment. As noted above, exclusion is only for one round. Precisely, if a member is excluded from group membership in round t, he/she does not make contribution or voting decisions in round t. Members excluded for round t,
automatically re-enter their groups and make first and second stage decisions in round t + 1. 24 When making exclusion decisions, all non-excluded group members are shown the individual contribution decisions of the other non-excluded members in the round. Excluded members are not shown individual decisions in their group in the round in which they are excluded. At the end of the second stage in a round, non-excluded members in CM-Ostracism are shown the number of votes for exclusion received by each non-excluded member. All group members, 23 Group membership can also change by members exiting voluntarily (see, for example, Ahn et al., 2008 , and Charness and Yang 2014 . We conducted a pair of treatments with and without a common-member -CM-Exit and No-CM-Exitwhere individuals could unilaterally exit their groups for the next round. We find that the exit option is very rarely used and that the availability of this option does not change outcomes relative to those observed in CM. We present this analysis in Appendix B5. 24 Temporary exclusion was implemented since previous work has shown the beneficial effects on cooperation of the opportunity to 'redeem oneself' (Charness and Yang, 2014) . however, whether excluded or not, are shown the total contributions in their group in the round, and in all previous rounds. In addition, all members are informed of which members are not excluded in the next round.
For purposes of comparison, we also conducted a treatment without a common-member, where group members could ostracise one another. In No-CM-Ostracism, as in No-CM, groups are composed of three members and are isolated. In a second stage in each round, group members vote on ostracism. Ostracism works the same way as in CM-Ostracism. Data was collected on 11 (X, Y) pairs (55 subjects) in CM-Ostracism and 8 groups (24 subjects) in No-CM-Ostracism.
We first investigate how ostracism is used. Figure 4 presents the average number of instances (rounds) in which the common-members and dedicated-members in CM-Ostracism were ostracised. The horizontal line presents the same information for group members in No-CM-Ostracism. Figure 4 shows that ostracism is rarely used in the absence of a common-member; a group member is ostracised for an average of 0.42 rounds out of 20. However, in the presence of a common-member, both common and dedicated-members are ostracised more often. Commonmembers are ostracised more often than are dedicated-members in HighC and LowC groups. However, the difference in ostracism rates between common-members and dedicated-members is significant only in LowC groups (SR p = 0.011). 25 Combining HighC and LowC groups, common-members with negative deviations (i.e., those who contributed less than the average contributions of others in the group) were ostracised in 32 out of 319 instances and dedicated-members in 33 out of 301 instances. Common-members with non-negative deviations were ostracised in only 3 out of 117 instances, and dedicatedmembers in 4 out of 571 instances. 26 The fact that groups almost never ostracise high contributors implies that the groups in this treatment condition are successful in targeting punishment at low contributors, and in avoiding 'anti-social punishment '. 27 In the context of costly peer punishment, previous work has shown that targeting of high contributors is prevalent, and is inimical to the achievement of cooperation (Hermann et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2010) . However, Casari and Luini (2009) find that a consensual peer punishment rule, where at least two group members must target a group member for that member to receive any punishment "endogenously filtered out the anti-social norm of a minority that was targeting cooperators" (p. 277). A majority voting rule requires consensus in our setting as well, and almost eliminates anti-social punishment. As discussed below, this combination of almost non-existent targeting of high contributors and targeting 'punishment' at low contributors allows both groups to sustain cooperation.
Figure 4. Average number of rounds a group member is ostracised
We now turn to examining individual contributions when ostracism is available, and comparing those to individual contributions in the other treatments with common-members. Figure 5 (a) presents time trends of average individual contributions by common-members in HighC and
LowC groups in the three treatments with a common-member. Figure 5 (b) presents contributions trends for dedicated-members. Table 3 presents summary statistics of individual contributions in CM-Ostracism. 28 As before, we find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 25 Regression analysis shown in Appendix B3 shows that this difference is not significant once we control for relative contribution levels. 26 There were 4 instances of groups with more than one group member excluded. This results in four commonmember observations and 8 dedicated-member observations being dropped from ostracism analysis. 27 This is also true in No-CM-Ostracism. Members with negative deviations in No-CM-Ostracism were ostracised in 14 out of 157 instances, while individuals with positive deviations were never ostracised in 323 instances. 28 Appendices B2.4 and B4 contain an analysis of contributions in No-CM-Ostracism. Importantly, unlike in CM, the common-members' average contributions in HighC and LowC groups are not significantly different (SR p = 0.213). Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3 in the presence of opportunities for ostracism.
Result 9:
In CM-Ostracism, the average of common-members' contributions are not signicantly different between HighC and LowC groups.
As with the comparison of CM to CM-Info, the average of common-members' contributions are slightly higher in HighC groups in CM-Ostracism than HighC groups in CM (9.23 vs. 7.79 tokens); but the difference is not statistically significant. However, the average of commonmembers' contributions are significantly higher in LowC groups in CM-Ostracism than LowC groups in CM (7.57 vs. 3.81 tokens; RS p = 0.016). Further, the average of common-members' total contributions to both groups are significantly higher in CM-Ostracism than in CM (16.80 vs. 11.6 tokens; RS p = 0.0226). Similar to CM-Info, on average, the common-members are now contributing just under 84% of their endowment. Thus, ostracism successfully raises contributions by common-members, approaching 100%. 29
Result 10: Relative to CM, average contributions of common-members' in CM-Ostracism are significantly increased to LowC groups, and in total.
In support of Hypothesis 5, in CM-Ostracism average contributions by dedicated-members are not significantly different between HighC and LowC groups (SR p = 0.722). Finally, relative to CM and CM-Info, average contributions of dedicated-members in HighC groups are no different in CM-Ostracism. Contributions of dedicated-members are higher in LowC groups in CM-Ostracism than in the other two, but the difference is significant only relative to CM. (RS p = 0.012). In CM-Ostracism the average of common-members' contributions are lower than those of dedicated-members in HighC groups, but the difference is only marginally significant (SR p = 0.091). However, their average contributions are significantly lower than those of dedicatedmembers in LowC groups (SR p = 0.003). Unlike in CM, however, this is not because contributions of both are languishing at low levels. On the contrary, contributions of dedicatedmembers in LowC groups are much higher than in CM.
Unlike the other two treatments with a common-member, total group contributions in LowC groups do not decline over time. Both HighC and LowC groups sustain contributions throughout. Further, in CM-Ostracism there is no significant difference between the contributions of dedicated-members in HighC and LowC groups (SR p = 0.722). Thus, contributions of dedicated-members in the two groups converge. Combined with the above result that ostracism is almost never used, we find support for the competition hypothesis (Hypothesis 5). Unlike in CM, initial performance does not determine group performance over time in CM-Ostracism. The groups with the initially lower contributions in a pair successfully use the threat of ostracism as a disciplining mechanism, and prevent the decline observed in LowC groups in CM. In the presence of ostracism, LowC groups sustain higher cooperation from dedicated and common-members. The common-member does not display divided loyalties; both groups attract the loyalty of the common-member. Thus, in support of Hypothesis 6, ostracism is successful in enforcing reciprocity from all group members.
This finding for the game setting with ostracism, however, may be a mixed blessing. As shown above, common-members contribute on average almost all of their endowment and tend to split their contributions almost equally between the two groups. Further, dedicated-members in both
HighC and LowC groups contribute just over half of their endowments. Average contributions of dedicated-members are not significantly different from 10 tokens in HighC or LowC groups in CM-Ostracism (SR p > 0.10 in each case). Thus, it appears that reciprocity between dedicated-members and common-members acts to impose an implicit constraint on the 30 See Appendix B2.3 for an analysis of group contributions in CM-Ostracism.
contributions of dedicated-members even though they do not, unlike common-members, face a binding resource constraint. 31
Conclusion
We study a feature inherent in many production settings, competition between paired-groups for team members who benefit from membership in both teams. In the treatment condition of primary concern, one individual is a common-member of two groups. The two groups are allowed to compete for his/her contributions to team output, the group public good. This treatment is contrasted with a setting where there is no common-membership between groups.
These two decision settings allow us to examine if the opportunity to compete for the resources of the common-member helps mitigate free-riding. In our initial treatment conditions, we find that the resources of the common-member diverge across groups in a pair. The group that begins with higher contributions continues to contribute at higher levels, partly as a result of the common-member becoming more 'loyal' to this group after the first decision round.
Contributions in the initially low-performing group are negatively affected. Upon observing lower contributions in this group, the common-member focuses more effort on the other group in the pair. Conditional cooperation, as implied by reciprocity, ensures that the lower performing group never recovers relative to the high-performing group. Thus, reciprocity in this context creates 'winners' and 'losers'.
Knowing that that the common-member is sufficiently reciprocal may be important in allowing other group members to compete for their resources, i.e., influence the common-member's contributions by increasing one's own contributions. We examine two additional treatment conditions that could potentially impact the degree of reciprocity in group members. First, we make public the common-member's contributions in both paired-groups. This change allows dedicated-members of each group more complete information on the cooperation 'type' of the common-member. Providing this additional information is only partly successful in promoting 31 Appendix B6 reports an analysis of earnings in treatments with a common-member. Since earnings and contributions have a one-to-one relationship in the linear VCM games we examine in CM and CM-Info, the earnings analysis parallels the contribution analysis in these treatments reported above. Ostracism has the potential to decrease earnings if group members are frequently ostracised. However, since ostracism is rarely used, earnings and contributions in CM-Ostracism are very similar. overall team production; it raises contributions of the common-member, but fails to significantly raise the contributions of other members of the low-performing groups.
Next, we examine a treatment where group members are allowed the opportunity to determine group membership through ostracism by majority voting. The threat of exclusion incentivises the common-member to be equally 'loyal' to both groups in the pair, thus encouraging higher contributions from dedicated-members as well. Teams accomplish this by effectively targeting punishment through ostracism of low contributors. However, while ostracism does raise cooperation, the endowment constraint faced by the common-member limits his/her effectiveness in raising total contributions. This latter result appears to be related to how norms of reciprocity affect behaviour in the setting we study, where agents are homogenous in resources that might be used for team production. More specifically, it appears dedicatedmembers respond to the actions of the common-member who has limited resources to share across teams.
Our experimental setting is simple in that there are only two groups and only one commonmember. However, our results are informative of behaviour in more general settings, particularly those with a greater number of groups and/or members with divided loyalties. As evidenced by our findings, reciprocity is a strong driver of behaviour in our setting. We draw on the theory of reciprocity and draw inferences for (expected) behaviour in more general settings. We present these implications in Appendix C.
Our study highlights the influence that competitive market forces between teams can have on team productivity. Further, it highlights the role of transparency of actions and self-governance of membership at the group level. Our study also identifies limits to the positive effects of competition when all agents are identical in productive capacity. This limitation suggests avenues for future studies such as settings in which common-members are more productive or have greater resources to offer than dedicated-members, thus enhancing the importance of gaining the loyalties of the common-member.
